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BANKRUPTCY-SECTION 70c-RECENT REACTIONS TO Constance
v. Harvey-The second sentence of section 70c of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act, as amended through 1952, reads as follows:
"The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming
into possession or control of the court, upon which a creditor
of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed
vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers
of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings,
whether or not such a creditor actually exists."1
This provision specifies one of the many powers of avoidance
that the bankruptcy act gives to the trustee in bankruptcy.2 Re-

166 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. (1952) §llOc.
Other sections granting powers of avoidance to the trustee are §§60b, 67d, and 70e(l).

2
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newed interest in section 70c has developed recently, primarily
because of several significant decisions in the federal courts. It
is the purpose of this comment to consider the impact of these
developments on the power of the trustee to avoid otherwise valid
security devices.
I.

Introduction-Constance v. Haruey

The main thrust of section 70c is to vest the trustee with the
rights of a hypothetical lien creditor as determined by reference
to applicable state law. The crucial interpretative question under
the provision is: at what time do the trustee's rights accrue? The
statute expressly states that the trustee's rights as a lien creditor
arise at the date of bankruptcy. But it has been suggested that
the interpretative difficulties arise because the section "does not
specify when credit is to be deemed to have been extended to the
debtor for purposes of the hypothetical lien." 3
Constance v. Haruey 4 is the most important case to give an answer to the question when the trustee shall be deemed to have become a creditor under section 70c. In this case the bankrupt,
some two years prior to the date of bankruptcy, executed a
purchase money chattel mortgage to appellant Constance. Constance delayed ten months in recording the mortgage, a delay
clearly unreasonable under the applicable New York law. In the
bankruptcy proceedings, the referee and the district court sustained the trustee's avoidance of Constance's chattel mortgage
lien. On the first hearing the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed because there was no showing that an actual
creditor extended credit to the bankrupt during the interval between the execution of the chattel mortgage and its belated recording.5 On rehearing, however, the court sustained the referee,
reasoning that the status of the trustee under section 70c is not
dependent on the existence of actual creditors. The court then
went on to say that as an "ideal" hypothetical creditor, 6 the trus-

3 Editor's comment at 125 following Kleinberg and M~sterson, "Constance v. Harvey
-A Defense," 62 COMM. L.J. 124 (1957).
4 (2d Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 571, cert. den. 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
5 At the time of the first hearing the court may have been applying the rule of
§70e(l) in which the trustee's rights are expressly dependent on the existence of an actual
creditor.
6 The "ideal" phraseology was used previously by the Second Circuit in the case of
Hoffman v. Cream-0-Products, (2d Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 649 at 650.
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tee can pretend to be a creditor who extended credit at whatever
time is most advantageous to him. The court apparently felt
that under section 70c the trustee's rights as a general, as distinguished from a lien, creditor may at the trustee's discretion
accrue at any time under applicable state law, and such rights are
not tied to the date of bankruptcy. The court then noted that
under applicable New York law a chattel mortgage not recorded
within a reasonable time can be avoided by any general creditor
who has extended credit in the interim, i.e., the period between
the date of the mortgage's execution and the date of its belated
recording. 7 Combining New York law and its own interpretation
of the trustee's rights under section 70c, the court took the final
step and held that the trustee, by asserting the rights of an "ideal"
hypothetical creditor who had extended credit during the interim
and who could have obtained a lien at the date of bankruptcy,
could avoid the Constance mortgage. The court expressly stated
that its decision was reached even though there was no proof that
any actual credit had been extended during the interim.
Criticism of Constance v. Harvey has been severe. 8 The most
fundamental criticism has been that it fails to preserve the proper
balance between the .bankruptcy act's two competing policies:
equality of distribution and preservation of fairly acquired security interests.9 It has been argued that the Constance holding affords
needless protection to non-existent creditors at the expense of
chattel mortgagees who are slow to record. 10 It is clear that there
is an alternative to the Constance interpretation of section 70c.
One writer has suggested the proper interpretation to be that the
trustee should be regarded as a "creditor without notice who
levied legal or equitable process at the time of bankruptcy and

7!{arst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893). When used in this comment the
word "interim" means the period between the execution date of the security transaction
in question and the date of its recording.
SSee 4 MooRE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §70.48, pp. 92-93 (Supp. 1958);
Weintraub, Levin, and Beldock, "The Strong-Arm Clause Strikes the Belated Chattel
Mortgage,'' 25 FoRD L. R.Ev. 261 (1956); Marsh, "Constance v. Harvey-The 'Strong-Arm
Clause' Re-Evaluated,'' 43 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 65 (1955). But see Kleinberg and Masterson,
"Constance v. Harvey-A Defense,'' 62 COMM. L.J. 124 (1957).
9Marsh, "Constance v. Harvey-The 'Strong-Arm Clause' Re-Evaluated," 43 CALIF.
L. R.Ev. 65 at 73-75 (1955).
10 A secondary criticism of the Constance rationale is that it renders nugatory §70e(l),
which vests in the trustee ·the rights of any actual creditor with a provable claim against
the bankrupt at the date of bankruptcy. See Marsh, "Constance v. Harvey-The 'StrongArm Clause' Re-Evaluated," 43 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 65 at 73-75 (1955).
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who also extended credit at the time of bankruptcy." 11 This interpretation is supported by other secondary authority, and presents the most consistent and valid specific objection to the Constance interpretation. In addition, this interpretation has been incorporated into a proposed congressional amendment of section 70c. 12
In light of this background it becomes desirable to consider
some of the recent state and federal reactions to the Constance
doctrine.
IL State Legislative Reaction to Constance v. Harvey
Analysis of state legislative reaction to the Constance case will
be limited mainly to chattel mortgage recording statutes.13 Under
most chattel mortgage recording statutes no Constance problem
can arise because these statutes are designed to protect only lien
creditors. Under such statutes no creditor can avoid a chattel
mortgage unless he has acquired a lien on the property of the
mortgagor prior to the recording date of the chattel mortgage. If
the date of bankruptcy is after the recording date of the mortgage,
the trustee cannot avoid the mortgage under section 70c. The
trustee gains nothing by using the Constance doctrine because
under the applicable state law a creditor cannot avoid- the chattel
mortgage unless he acquires a lien before the mortgage has been
recorded. By the express wording of section 70c, however, the
trustee's status as a lien creditor accrues only at the date of bankruptcy which, by hypothesis, is after the recording of the mortgage.
Thus only chattel mortgage recording statutes designed to protect general creditors from unrecorded mortgages can be involved
in a Constance situation.14 While such statutes all have the common design of protecting the general creditor, they differ as to
the time within which a chattel mortgagee must record in order
to protect his security from general creditors who actually ex11 Marsh, "Constance v. Harvey-The 'Strong-Arm Clause' Re-Evaluated," 43 CALIF.
L, R.Ev. 65 at 74 {1955).
12 H.R. 4158, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959). The amendment was favorably regarded by
the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives at a hearing on March 5, 1959.
13 A similar analysis could be made of state statutes regulating other types of security
transactions, but for ease of presentation the analysis of this comment is limited to
statutes regulating the chattel mortgage transaction.
14 An example of such a statute is the New York act involved in the Constance case
itself. 32 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) §230.
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tended credit in the interim between the execution and recording
of the mortgage.15
Before 1952 and the emergence of section 70c in its present
form, eleven states had chattel mortgage recording statutes capable
of giving rise to a Constance problem.16 In only one of these states,
Michigan, has there been legislative reaction which was clearly
prompted by a desire to avoid the effect of Constance v. Harvey. 17
Prior to 1956, the Michigan statute18 as judicially construed required a chattel mortgage to be recorded "immediately" after its
date of execution. If the mortgage was not recorded immediately
-i.e., simultaneously with its execution-any general creditor who
actually extended credit during the interim could avoid the mortgage. The Constance rationale works a particularly harsh result
under such a statute. The slightest delay in recording by the chattel mortgagee permits the trustee to avoid the mortgage by applying the Constance interpretation of section 70c; the trustee merely
pretends to be a hypothetical creditor who has extended credit
during the period of delay in recording. That the mortgage may
have been recorded several years prior to the date of bankruptcy
does not defeat the trustee under section 70c when the Constance
interpretation is applied.
In 1956 the Michigan legislature amended the state's chattel
mortgage recording statute. The amendment, Act 153, effective
through the first nine months of 1957, attached to the previous
statute a proviso that no chattel mortgage, if recorded within 14
15 Some "Constance" statutes, as in New York and Missouri, fix the interim period
if the chattel mortgage is not recorded "within a reasonable time." Other "Constance"
statutes, as in California, fix the interim period if the chattel mortgage is not recorded
"immediately" after its execution. Thus, the latter type of statute protects any general
creditor who has extended credit during the interim, no matter how short the delay in
the recording of the mortgage.
16 The eleven states were Alabama, Ala. Code (1940) tit. 47, §123; California, Cal. Civ.
Code Ann. (Deering, 1949) §2957; Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.140; Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. (1942; Rec. 1956) §§868-869; Missouri, IMo. Rev. Stat. (1949)
§443.460; New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. (1940) §§46: 28-5 and 46: 28-10; New York, 32 N.Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) §230; South Carolina, S.C. Code (1952) §60-101; South
Dakota, S.D. Code (1939) §39.0408; Utah, Utah Code Ann. (1953) §9-1-1; Wyoming, Wyo.
Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §59-105.
17 The New Jersey statute was amended in 1953. The immediate recording required
by the statute is now defined as any recording within five days from the execution date
of the chattel :mortgage. One of the amendment's effects is to protect any mortgage,
recorded within the five-day period, from avoidance by the trustee's use of the Constance
interpretation of §70c. There is no indication to what extent a desire to avoid the effect
of Constance v. Harvey prompted the 1953 New Jersey amendment.
18 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.140. The pre-1956 statute is construed in General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Coller, (6th Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 584.
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days after its execution, shall be void as against creditors of the
mortgagor in "insolvency proceedings."19 In the case of In re
Perry,20 a federal district court held that the term "insolvency
proceedings" as used in Act 153 included federal bankruptcy proceedings. However, the question whether Act 153 as construed was
an invalid encroachment on an area pre-empted by the Federal
Bankruptcy Act was not considered in the Perry case. This question arose in the recent case of In the Matter of Freedman. 21 The
facts of this case presented a typical Constance v. Harvey situation,
and the court assumed without deciding that the Constance case
was good law. The court held that in the absence of Act 153 the
trustee, under the Constance interpretation of section 70c, could
have avoided the chattel mortgage in question. But, the court also
held that Act 153 eliminated in insolvency proceedings the right
of an interim creditor, and therefore the right of the hypothetical
interim creditor under section 70c, to avoid a chattel mortgage
recorded within 14 days from its execution date. The court upheld
the validity of Act 153 against the trustee's assertion that it conflicted with section 70c of the bankruptcy act. This decision was
based on the familiar doctrine that Congress intended that the
powers it granted to the trustee under section 70c were to be determined by reference to applicable state law including, in the
court's opinion, Act 153 which determined the rights of interim
creditors in insolvency proceedings. It was felt that Act 153 was
not directed solely at bankruptcy proceedings because it also regulated the rights of creditors in state insolvency proceedings.
Although the result of the court's decision is to avoid the harsh
effects of the Constance construction of section 70c, the reasoning
in upholding Act 153 as construed in the Perry case appears to
be questionable. It seems established that the federal bankruptcy
act has "suspended" the operation of state insolvency statutes and
permits collateral attack upon all subsequent proceedings taken
under those laws.22 Thus the area in which state law may regulate
the relations between an embarrassed debtor and his creditors is
restricted mainly to statutory regulation of proceedings available
19 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.140 as amended by Act 153, Mich. Public Acts,
1956. The express wording of the amendment is: "Provided, however, that any such
[chattel] mortgage shall not be void in the case of insolvency proceedings as against the
creditors of the mortgagor if filed within 14 days from the date thereof..••"
20 (S.D. Mich. 1958) 157 F. Supp. 910.
21 (S.D. Mich. 1959) 168 F. Supp. 25.
22 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
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at common law, such as compos1t1on and general assignment.23
Act 153 appears, therefore, to be a patent attempt by a state legislature to regulate the rights of creditors in federal bankruptcy
proceedings; as indicated in the Perry case the phrase "insolvency
proceedings" can reasonably have no other reference than to bankruptcy proceedings.24
Even if it is conceded that Act 153 was intended to regulate
the rights of creditors in such state proceedings as composition
and general assignment, the act should be invalid so long as it is
construed to apply to bankruptcy proceedings as well. It matters
not whether Act 153 is directed solely at bankruptcy proceedings
or is so directed in combination with an intent to regulate the
rights of creditors in certain state proceedings. In either case the
act represents an encroachment on the power of Congress to regulate the rights of the trustee under section 70c that is forbidden by
the supremacy clause of the Constitution.25 If construed to apply
only to state proceedings, Act 153 would raise no federal question;
nor would the act, so construed, affect the trustee's rights as a hypothetical creditor under section 70c. Thus, a major error of the
Freedman case is the failure of the court to distinguish between
the admitted power of state law to regulate the rights of creditors
in state proceedings and the lack of power in state law to dictate
what standard of reference shall be used to determine the rights of
the trustee in federal bankruptcy proceedings.
Act 153 was short-lived, however; in 1956 a second amendment
to the Michigan chattel mortgage recording statute was passed.
This amendment, Act 233, became effective as of September 1957,
repealed Act 153, and provided instead "that no purchase money
mortgage shall be void as against creditors of the mortgagor if
filed within 14 days from the date of execution of such mortgage. . . ." 26 Unlike Act 153, Act 233 applies only to purchase
money chattel mortgages,27 but as to this type of mortgage the act
defines the rights of creditors in all proceedings to which Michigan
23 Johnson v. Star,
24 "The law seems

287 U.S. 527 (1933).
to be well established that the words insolvency and bankruptcy
are synonymous terms in ordinary usage, meaning, and common understanding." In re
Perry, (S.D. Mich. 1958) 157 F. Supp. 910 at 915.
25 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. The power of Congress to regulate bankruptcy is derived
expressly from U.S. CONST., art I, §8, cl. 4.
26 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.140 as amended by Act 233, Mich. Public Acts, 1957.
27 This limitation is probably the result of the policy consideration that purchase
money chattel mortgages are entitled to the same favorable treatment as are purchase
money mortgages on realty.
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law is applicable. Unlike Act 153, Act 233 evidences no intent to
encroach on the power of Congress to define the rights of the
trustee in bankruptcy proceedings.
Of primary interest is the fact that Act 233 adopts the "fixedperiod" statutory device to regulate priority between creditors of
the mortgagor and the chattel mortgagee. Michigan is in the
minority group of states in which the courts have construed
chattel mortgage recording statutes to protect interim general
creditors.28 This policy of protecting interim general creditors
conflicts with any attempt of complete avoidance of the problems
raised by the Constance interpretation of section 70c. To the extent that a state protects interim general creditors, the trustee
will be able to take advantage of the Constance interpretation of
section 70c. Thus, even as to purchase money mortgages, Act 233
does not completely avoid the effect of the Constance construction
of section 70c. If a purchase money mortgage is not recorded
within the 14-day period fixed by the act, the trustee can avoid
the mortgage by asserting the rights of a hypothetical creditor
who has extended credit prior to the recording date of the mortgage. Act 233 does, however, reach an equitable compromise between the state's policy of protecting interim general creditors
and the desirability of avoiding the effects of the Constance interpretation of section 70c, through use of a relation-back device.
The priority of any purchase money mortgage recorded within
the 14-day period is related back to the execution date of the
mortgage. Thus, Act 233 accomplishes three things. First, as to
recordings not within the 14-day period, the act preserves the
state policy of protecting interim general creditors. Second, as to
recordings within the 14-day period the act avoids completely the
effects of the Constance interpretation of section 70c. And third,
through use of the "fixed-period" and "relation-back" devices,
the act gives to the diligent mortgagee a certainty of protection
not available under the pre-1956 Michigan statute.
Act 233 raises the broader question of the desirability of protecting interim general creditors under any circumstances. An inherent weakness of recording statutes that protect general creditors is persuasively stated in the case of In re Consorto Constr.
Co.29 In discussing such statutes the court points out that chattel
28See note 16 supra for a list of the eleven states whose statutes have been construed
to protect interim general creditors.
20 (3d Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 676.
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mortgagees can easily frustrate the attempt to protect general creditors. If a mortgage is not recorded within the time required by
state law, the mortgagee can cut off the priority of interim general
creditors by the simple device of re-executing the "old" mortgage
and recording this "new" instrument at once.30 Since the "new"
mortgage is recorded within the time required by state law, it
creates a lien in favor of the mortgagee that is good against all
general creditors. Priority rights of the general creditors are then
determined by reference to the "new" instead of the "old" mortgage. To require such re-execution of the old instrument as a
basis for effective recordation is aptly termed "worthless formalism" by the court in the Consorto case.31 Thus, the specter of
Constance v. Harvey can have beneficial results in those states
with "Constance-type" statutes. First, it may encourage such states
to amend their recording statutes to reach a more workable compromise between the policy of protecting general creditors and the
desire to avoid the effects of the Constance construction of section
70c. And second, such states may be encouraged to consider the
broader policy question of the desirability of protecting general
creditors under any circumstances.

III. Federal Judicial Reaction to Constance v. Harvey
Federal judicial reaction to the Constance case has been infrequent but generally negative. The reaction has been of two types:
cases which assume without deciding that the Constance rationale
is sound but then refuse to extend it to new factual situations,32
and cases which expressly repudiate the Constance interpretation
of section 70c. With the exception of one case, however, this repudiation has been in the form of mere dictum.
The Fifth Circuit has recently decided two cases in which it
refused to extend the Constance doctrine. In General Motors Acceptance Corp v. Saliba,33 it was ruled that a state statute can
retroactively affect the rights of the trustee as a hypothetical creditor under section 70c. The court held that the trustee's rights un-

ao Apparently no court :has ever held that the "new" mortgage is in substance the
"old" mortgage, so that the priority of general creditors should therefore be determined
by reference to the old mortgage.
81 In re Consorto Constr. Co., (3d Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 676 at 679.
82 A good example of this type of case is In the Matter of Freedman, (S.D. Mich. 1959)
168 F. Supp. 25, note 21 supra, discussed at length in part II of this comment.
83 (5th Cir. 1958) 260 F. (2d) 262.
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der section 70c are to be determined by reference to state law as
it existed at the time of bankruptcy, thereby rejecting a possible
extension of the Constance rationale which would allow the
trustee to assert the rights of a hypothetical creditor under the
state law as it existed at the time of the security transaction in
question. 34 In the second Fifth Circuit case, Brookhaven Bank and
Trust Co. v. Gwin,35 the court assumed that the Constance case
was good law and that the trustee could have avoided the chattel
mortgage in question. The contest in this case did not involve the
trustee but was between the chattel mortgagee and an interim
lienor, the trustee having relinquished all claim to the chattel.
In upholding the priority of the interim lienor the court made
it clear that the Constance rationale works only for the trustee's
benefit and could not be relied upon by other contestants to
settle the status of the chattel mortgage.36 Thus, the court again
declined to extend the Constance rationale by refusing to allow
persons other than the trustee to benefit derivatively from his
rights as a hypothetical creditor under section 70c.
The remaining cases involving section 70c are of varying degrees of helpfulness in determining whether there is a judicial
trend toward repudiation of Constance v. Harvey. Since the 1950
amendment to section 70c, several federal courts have discussed
the provision in general terms, but many of these discussions have
not been directed toward determining the effect of the 1950
amendment, nor have they referred to the Constance rationale or
involved cases with factual situations similar to that in the Constance case.37 These cases, therefore, are of little value in appraising federal judicial reaction to the Constance interpretation of
section 70c.
34 " ••• [I]t 1would ·be a distortion of the intent and effect of Sec. 70, sub. c, ••• to
hold that, under the facts of this case, it enshrines the preferential position ••• of the
trustee, over the holder of the conditional sales contract beyond the power of the leg•
islature of Georgia to change it." General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Saliba, (5th Cir.
1958) 260 F. (2d) 262 at 264.
35 (5th Cir. 1958) 253 F. (2d) 17.
36 "As has just been indicated, however, subdivisions (c) and (e) of Section 70 operate
in favor of the trustee. We have been cited to no case, nor have we found any, holding
that either of those subdivisions can be used as a basis for determining relative priorities
ben\l'een nll'o lien holders as against whom the trustee claims no right." Brookhaven
Bank and Trust Co. v. Gwin, (5th Cir. 1958) 253 F. (2d) 17 at 23.
37 See In re Valley City Furniture Co., (S.D. Mich. 1958) 161 F. Supp. 39; In re Ripp,
(7th Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 849; Kerry v. Schneider, (9th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 896; United
States v. Eiland, (4th Cir. 1%5) 2~3 F. (2d) 118; In re Driscoll, (S.D. Cal. 1954) 127 F.
Supp. 81; In re Kranz Candy Co., (7th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 588.

1959]

COMMENTS

1237

In other cases the factual situations were such that the Constance construction of section 70c could probably have been applied to avoid the security transaction involved, but this construction apparently was not urged and was clearly not referred to in
any of the decisions. 38 It could be argued that these cases represent an implied repudiation of the Constance rationale, but any
such conclusion would clearly rest on a weak foundation.
A third series of cases contains dicta from which a more substantial implied repudiation of the Constance rationale can be
drawn. Since none of these cases involved facts similar to the
Constance case, however, the dicta found in these decisions can at
best be regarded as mere expressions of judicial dissatisfaction
with Constance v. Harvey. Typical of this group of cases is McKay
v. Trusco Finance Co.,89 in which the Fifth Circuit implied that
if the security transaction involved had been recorded before the
date of bankruptcy, the trustee could avoid the transaction only
by asserting the rights of an actual creditor under section 70e(l)
of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 and that the trustee would not be allowed under section 70c to assert the rights of a hypothetical
creditor who extended credit in the interim.
In the quite recent case of In the Matter of Billings,41 a
Missouri federal district court was faced with facts and a state
statute much like those in the Constance case. The court expressly
held against the Constance interpretation of section 70c. This case
involved a purchase money chattel mortgage given by the bankrupt to the Borden Company and not recorded until 14 days
after its execution. Under Missouri law interim general creditors
can avoid a chattel mortgage which is not recorded within a reasonable time.42 After holding that a 14-day delay was unreasonable, the referee held that the trustee by using the Constance

38 See Exchange National Bank of Colorado Springs v. Hough, (10th Cir. 1958) 258
F. (2d) 785; In re Cotter, (S.D. Mich. 1953) II3 F. Supp. 859, affd. sub nom. Emery v.
Union Inv. Co., (6th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 183.
39 (5th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 431 at 435. See also In the Matter of Luckenbill, (E.D.
Pa. 1957) 156 F. Supp. 129.
40 52 Stat. 882 (1938), II U.S.C. (1952) §II0e(l). The case of In re American Textile
Printers Co., (D.C. N.J. 1957) 152 F. Supp. 901, is cited in 4 MOORE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., §70.51, p. 100 (Supp. 1958), as holding contrary to the Constance case.
T.he Textile case, however, did not involve a Constance problem because the applicable
state statute protected only lien creditors and not general creditors.
41 (W.D. Mo. 1959) 170 F. Supp. 253.
42 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §443.460. The Missouri statute is construed in connection
with §70e(l) in the case of In re Alton Milk Co., (W.D. Mo. 1957) 157 F. Supp. 23.
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construction of section 70c could avoid the chattel mortgage, it
being unnecessary to prove that actual creditors had extended
credit in the interim. The district court, assuming also that a 14day delay was unreasonable under Missouri law, reversed the decision of the referee on the grounds that Constance v. Haroey
was an incorrect interpretation of section 70c. In reaching its
decision the court stated that the trustee could not assert the
rights of a hypothetical creditor who extended credit in the interim because no actual creditors had extended credit in the interim.48 Throughout its discussion of the trustee's rights under
section 70c the court stressed the fact that no rights of actual
creditors had intervened between the execution date of the chattel
mortgage and the date of its recording.
Although the result of the Billings case is sound, it appears
that the underlying reasoning is perhaps incorrect. To say that
no hypothetical creditor on the date of bankruptcy could avoid
the chattel mortgage because no rights of actual creditors intervened in the interim is to say that the trustee's rights under section
70c are derivative rights, dependent on the existence of actual
creditors. This is clearly contrary to the language of the statute.44
The strongest argument against the Constance interpretation does
not make the trustee's rights under section 70c tum upon the
existence or non-existence of actual creditors. It is instead based on
the proposition that any rights accruing to the trustee under section 70c must be rights which accrue at the date of bankruptcy and
not at some prior hypothetical time. With reference to the time
when the trustee's rights as a lien creditor accrue, this proposition
is not open to question.45 The result should be the same with
reference to the trustee's rights as a general creditor under section 70c.46 When a debtor-creditor relationship is established im-

48 " ••• There was no 'perfect' or 'ideal' hypothetical creditor on the day of bankruptcy, because no rights had intervened between the time of the execution of the chattel
mortgage and the date of its filing, and could not therefore, on the day of bankruptcy,
have asserted any right to the property." In the -Matter of Billings, (W.D. Mo. 1959) 170
F. Supp. 253 at 258.
44 Section 70c expressly states that the trustee can assert the rights of a hypothetical
creditor "whether or not sucb a creditor actually exists." 66 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C.
' (1952) §ll0c.
45 Section 70c expressly states that the lien of the hypothetical creditor arises "at the
date of bankruptcy." 66 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. (1952) §ll0c. See also Bailey v. Baker
lee Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268 (1915).
46 See Weintraub, Levin, and Beldock, "The Strong-Arm Clause Strikes the Belated
Chattel Mortgage," 25 FoRD. L. tREv. 261 at 265, 269, · 270-271 (1956). The writers stress
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portant legal rights accrue to the creditor, rights which in many
cases dep.end upon the time that credit was extended.47 The trustee
under section 70c should not be allowed to assert the rights of a
hypothetical general creditor when the rights asserted depend
upon the creation, prior to the date of bankruptcy, of a hypothetical debtor-creditor relationship.
It is not the absence of actual creditors in the hypothetical
class which makes the Constance construction of section 70c unsound. Rather, it is unsound because it unreasonably denies protection to security transactions perfected prior to the date of bankruptcy. If the trustee under section 70c is regarded as a hypothetical creditor who extended credit at the date of bankruptcy, a
proper balance would be struck between the competing policies
of equality of distribution and the preservation of fairly acquired
security interests.
IV. Conclusion
State legislatures can profitably use the Constance case as a
springboard for reviewing the policy which underlies their respective recording statutes dealing with chattel security transactions. State legislation should be framed so as not to encroach upon
the congressional power to establish the standard of reference used
to define the trustee's powers under section 70c. If a state wishes
both to preserve its policy of protecting general creditors and to
avoid the harsh results of the Constance interpretation of section
70c, constructive legislation is possible. The state can utilize the
fixed-period device which allows the holder of a security interest,
by perfecting the security transaction within the fixed period, to
relate his priority back to the execution date of the transaction
involved.
Federal judicial reaction to Constance v. Harvey appears to
establish a trend toward repudiation of the Constance interpretation of section 70c. While this reaction is sound, the federal courts
should carefully weigh the reasons they give for this repudiation.
The most persuasive reason is not one which makes rejection of
the fact that §70c historically was intended to confer rights on the trustee only at the
date of ,bankruptcy and not at some prior hypothetical time.
47 An example of such rights are those of priority. The numerous state statutes which
make the creditor's priority tum upon his status as a prior, interim, or subsequent general
creditor show the importance attached to the time that the debtor-creditor relationship
arose.
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the Constance rationale turn upon the existence or non-existence
of actual creditors. Rather, rejection should be based on the policy
consideration that section 70c was not intended to permit the trustee to assert the rights of a hypothetical creditor accruing prior to
the date of bankruptcy. Much confusion would be removed from
this area by a congressional amendment to section 70c stating expressly that the hypothetical creditor referred to is a creditor extending credit at the date of bankruptcy. Until such an amendment, however, the Constance case should continue to have a
catalystic effect in those states with "Constance-type" statutes.
This effect may nevertheless be beneficial if it produces constructive reappraisal of state statutes and careful analysis by the federal
courts of the trustee's powers under section 70c.
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